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FEAR OF AIDS: THE CATALYST FOR EXPANDING
JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF A DUTY TO PREVENT
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS BEYOND TRADITIONAL BOUNDS
KAREN L. CHADWICK*

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) has
reached epidemic proportions in the United States. As the prevalence of
AIDS cases has increased, so has the public's awareness of the dire
consequences of infection with the virus causing AIDS. For many, the
omnipresence of AIDS has led to fear; in some cases, the fear has reached
the level of hysteria. Not surprisingly, the combination of fear and a
deadly disease has led to a number of lawsuits where the fearful party
has sought compensation for emotional distress; thus, the "AIDSphobia"
cases were born. Restrictions on the legal concepts of duty, breach and
cognizable injury have been arbitrarily abandoned in some AIDSphobia
cases in a judicial attempt to remedy this elusive harm. The public's fear
of AIDS coupled with a judicial mentality of expanding liability has, to
a large extent, transformed the cases involving AIDS into a morass of
contradiction and inconsistent results.
This article traces the evolution of negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims from the traditional rules narrowly restricting the parameters of recovery for mental anguish to the uncharted area of tort law
known as the "fear of AIDS" or "AIDSphobia" cases. The journey
through the emotional distress cases provides a foundation for recognizing
the limited circumstances under which a duty to prevent "fear of AIDS"
should be recognized.
Part I explores the historical basis for a duty to prevent emotional
distress. This discussion focuses on how courts have defined the duty to
prevent emotional distress, and examines the factors they have found
relevant in determining whether a duty exists. Part I then considers the
recognition of a duty to prevent emotional distress based on physical
risk, bystander status and the relationship of the parties. Finally, this
section examines the limitations on duties to prevent emotional distress
imposed in the "fear of cancer" cases.
Part II considers how extant limitations on duty have been recognized
in the context of "fear of AIDS" cases. It also examines those cases
where recovery has been allowed for "fear of AIDS" based upon previously unrecognized concepts of duty.
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for their research and thoughtful suggestions.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

In Part III, this article concludes that the creeping expansion of recovery
for emotional distress which is taking place in the "fear of AIDS" cases
is unsupported by precedent and is, in many instances, an arbitrary and
unwarranted extension of tort recovery.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RATIONALE THAT ALLOWS
RECOVERY FOR NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS

Emotional distress has long been recognized as a legitimate component
of recovery either where the defendant has acted intentionally or where
2
the defendant's negligence in the first instance results in physical injury.
Damages for emotional distress absent intent or physical injury have
traditionally been allowed in only a limited number of cases.' In particular,
recovery has been allowed where the mental distress is the result of the
negligent transmission of a death notice 4 or the negligent mishandling of
a body. 5 Emotional distress damages in consequence of such negligence,
however, have not generally rested upon tort considerations of duty and
breach, but rather upon "the making of the contract" for handling the
body or sending the telegraph, 6 or upon the idea that there is a quasiproperty right in a dead body.7
In fact, courts have been loathe to allow recovery where emotional
distress has been the sole result of negligence.' The distrust of such claims
has been based on a pervasive suspicion that claims for emotional distress-without more-are trivial, difficult to prove and thus not an
appropriate use of judicial resources. 9 It has also been urged that where
the defendant is only negligent, her degree of fault does not warrant

I. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n. v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 285 (Cal. 1952); Funeral
Services by Gregory v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79, 80 (W. Va. 1991); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1965); Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 44 P.
320, 322 (Cal. 1896).
3. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) (explaining the view that claims for
emotional distress without physical injury should be disallowed).
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A note at 24, (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1963)
(stating that seven states recognize recovery for mishandling of a message concerning death or illness
without any physical injury and an additional four states recognize such recovery by statute).
5. See, e.g., Brown Funeral Homes & Ins. Co. v. Baughn, 148 So. 154, 157 (Ala. 1933);
Chelini v. Nieri, 196 P.2d 915, 915 (Cal. 1948). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868,
at 172 (Tentative Draft No. 16, 1970).
6. See Bowers v. Colonial Stages Interstate Transit, 43 S.W.2d 497-98 (Tenn. 1931).
7. See Blanchard v. Brawley, 75 So. 2d 891, 893 (La. Ct. App. 1954); Lott v. State, 225
N.Y.S.2d 434, 436 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868, at 173 (Tentative
Draft No. 16, 1970).
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) ("If the actor's conduct is negligent as
creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another,
and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable
damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance").
9. See Kalen v. Terre Haute & 1. R.R., 47 N.E. 694, 695, (Ind. Ct. App. 1897); Knaub v.
Gotwalt, 220 A.2d 646, 648 (Pa. 1966).
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recovery for mere emotional injury and that recognition of such claims
would result in numerous fraudulent claims.' 0
The Physical Injury Requirement and Impact as a Substitute for
Bodily Harm
The requirement of a physical injury as a threshold for imposing liability
for emotional distress has developed in two directions. First, recovery
has been awarded by courts where a bona fide bodily injury precedes
the plaintiff's emotional distress, i.e., the parasitic damage rule." Alternatively, recovery has been allowed where the emotional distress manifests itself in some physical injury. 2
The idea that emotional distress must be a sequela to bodily injury
to support recovery led to an early recognition of an "impact" as a
sufficient indicium of "injury" to substantiate an award for emotional
distress damages. 3 Impact served the laudable purpose of establishing
that the defendant had imposed a recognized risk of physical harm upon
the plaintiff, and thus supported the existence of the defendant's duty
to prevent the emotional harm attendant to the type of physical risk
inherent in the impact. However, the necessity of bodily injury as a
prelude to recovery lost much of its vitality when it took the guise of
impact. Impact became sufficient to establish liability although it was
harmless in itself.' 4 Indeed, impact has been found in the slightest interference with the plaintiff's body. In one of the most extreme stretches
of judicial imagination, impact was found where a circus horse "evacuated
his bowels" into plaintiff's lap causing plaintiff emotional distress."
According to Prosser, "[t]he true value of the impact requirement may
lie in the opportunity which is' 6afforded to the defendant to testify that
there was in fact no impact.'
By 1963, a majority of jurisdictions had abandoned impact as a threshold requirement to recover for emotional distress. 7 In lieu of impact,
most jurisdictions began to recognize that emotional distress, manifested
as a physical injury caused by the defendant's breach of duty to prevent
physical harm, was sufficient to support recovery. In other words, where
the actor's conduct created a risk of physical harm to the plaintiff that

A.

10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (1965).
11. See Martinez v. Teague, 96 N.M. 446, 451, 631 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Ct. App. 1981).
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 436, 313 (1965).
Ct. App. 1978). The court noted that
13. See Kaiserman v. Bright, 377 N.E.2d 261, 264 (I11.
"it is clear that Illinois demands the pleading and proof of a physical impact, or contemporaneous
physical injury ... [i]n Illinois, if there is no physical impact, the right to recovery exists only in
those cases where the infliction of severe emotional injuries was intentional" (citation omitted). Id.
14. See Morton v. Stack, 170 N.E. 869 (Ohio 1930) (recognizing inhalation of smoke as impact);
Porter v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 63 A. 860 (N.J. 1906) (recognizing dust in eyes as impact).
15. See Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 144 S.E. 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 1928); see also W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 364 (5th ed. 1984).
16. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 54, at 364.
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 at 22, (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1963) (listing
cases abrogating the impact rule. It is also noted that by 1963 a diminishing minority adhered to
the loosely defined impact rule.).
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fell short of actually causing physical harm but did cause emotional
injury which, in turn, manifested itself in physical injury, the plaintiff
could recover for both the emotional and physical injuries. 8 This principle
is best illustrated in a series of miscarriage cases.' 9 In these cases, a
pregnant plaintiff was typically put in fear of bodily injury by an instrumentality set in motion by defendant. Although the instrumentality
fell short of an impact upon plaintiff, the plaintiff's fear nonetheless
caused her miscarriage. 20 The very physical risk created by the defendant's
negligent conduct came to fruition as a result of the plaintiff's fear.
Recovery was also allowed in the unusual instance where defendant's
conduct created a risk of severe emotional distress, and the risk of
emotional harm was such that one could also reasonably foresee a risk
of physical injury. 2' In both instances, the presence of bodily harm served
as proof that the defendant had breached a duty owed to the plaintiff,
including a duty to prevent the attendant emotional distress.
The requirement of a physical component to the complained mental
distress served to vitiate the fear of trivial or fraudulent claims. 22 Underlying the "physical manifestation" rule is the principle that "[fjright
alone, is not an injury that may be the basis of a claim for damages,
but physical injury due to fright is compensable. 21 3 Eventually, many
jurisdictions dispensed with the physical manifestation component and
allowed recovery as long as other factors supported the genuineness of
24
the plaintiff's claim of emotional distress.
B.

Bystander Status as the Basis for Recovery of Negligently
Inflicted Emotional Distress
Where-the plaintiff suffered emotional distress as a mere bystander at
the scene bf an injury to a third person, a more expansive view allowing
recovery evolved. The earliest cases allowing "bystanders" to recover for
negligent infliction of emotional distress required the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant's negligent conduct resulted in an impact on plaintiff's

18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(2) (1965).
19. See Richardson v. Pridmore, 217 P.2d 113, 117 (Cal. 1950); Vargas v. Ruggiero, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 568, 573 (Cal. 1961).
20. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 436 cmt. b, illus. 2 (1965):
A so negligently drives a team of horses that they get out of hand and run away.
They are not stopped until they stand with their heads one on either side of B,
who is in the path of the run-aways. The horses do not touch B, nor does she
faint or fall, but she sustains a severe fright and shock, which brings on a miscarriage.
A is subject to liability to B for both the mental disturbance and the miscarriage.
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(1) (1965).
22. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 54, at 361. "Where the defendant's negligence causes only
mental disturbance, without accompanying physical injury, illness or other physical consequences,
and in the absence of some other independent basis for tort liability, the great majority of courts
still hold that in ordinary cases there can be no recovery." Id.
23. Cook v. Maier, 92 P.2d 434, 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939).
24. See, e.g., Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772 (Mo. 1983) (rejecting the requirement
of a physical manifestation of the psychic injury and allowing the claim in those cases where the
distress was medically diagnosable and of sufficient severity so as to be medically significant).
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body. 25 In this respect, the bystander cases followed the path of other
negligence cases where no third parties were involved and there was direct
emotional harm to a plaintiff resulting from his proximity to the risk
of bodily injury. Although the impact itself did not have to be substantial
enough to warrant recovery, the notion of impact still sufficed to substantiate the idea that the emotional distress was "parasitic" to the26
"injury" caused by defendant's breach of the duty owed to the plaintiff.
Because the early negligent infliction of emotional distress cases, whether
arising out of bystander or direct liability, hinged on a finding of impact,
this requirement negated any special status given bystanders. In essence,
bystander liability was grounded on the same fiction as direct liability.
The impact rule in bystander cases has now been displaced in almost
every jurisdiction 27 by one of two tests for recovery. The first departure
from the impact requirement was the so-called "zone of danger" rule,
which relied on the proximity of the plaintiff to the risk of harm in
determining liability. 21 Subsequently, some jurisdictions adopted a "foreseeability test," which hinged on the proximity of the plaintiff to the
harm of another coupled with the relationship of the plaintiff to the
injured party. 29 In addition, under either test, most jurisdictions initially
adhered to the requirement that there be some physical indicia of the
claimed emotional distress.3 0
The "zone of danger" rule required that, in order for a plaintiff to
recover for emotional distress as a bystander to the injury of a third
person, she must be positioned in relation to the danger so that the risk
created by the defendant would result in fear and fright on the part of
plaintiff for her own safety." The "zone of danger" rule thus served
the exact same purpose as the impact rule: the risk of harm created by
the defendant was such that one could reasonably infer that the defendant's act2 directly and foreseeably resulted in emotional distress to the
3

plaintiff.

25. See Brisbose v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 303 S.W.2d 619, 623 (Mo. 1957); Little v.
Williamson, 441 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 1982); Cadillac Motor Car Division v. Brown, 428 So. 2d 301,
302, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Ky. 1980).
26. The impact rule was justified as a check so that alleged wrongdoers would not be subject
to a plethora of claims. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 47 N.E. 88, 89 (Mass. 1897).
27. But see Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Ctr., 816 P.2d 593 (Or. 1991) (retaining
the impact rule as to physical violations).
28. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y. 1969); see also Whetham v. Bismark
Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 1984); Shelton v.
Russell Pipe & Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1978).
29. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). Note the more restricted form of the Dillon
v. Legg foreseeability test enunciated in Thing v. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). See e.g.,
Cohen v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 450 N.E.2d 581 (Mass. 1983); Wargelin v. Sisters of Mercy
Health Corp. 385 N.W.2d 732 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); Versland v. Caron Transport, 671 P.2d 583
(Mont. 1983); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983).
30. See discussion supra part IA.
31. See Keck v. Jackson, 593 P.2d 668 (Ariz. 1979); Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp.
314 (D. Colo. 1965).
32. See generally Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300 (Conn. 1979); Lessard v. Tarca, 133 A.2d 625
(Conn. 1957); Quill v. Trans World Airlines, 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); Stadler v.
Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980).
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Although a few early cases allowed a mother to recover for physical
injury resulting from emotional distress caused by viewing an injury to
her child,33 such recovery was generally disallowed under the "zone of
danger" rationale. The objection to such recovery was that unless the
mother was put at physical risk she was an unforeseeable plaintiff.3 4 The
"zone of danger" test, although more expansive than the impact test,
resulted in what many considered arbitrary results. Not surprisingly, the
"zone of danger" test was eventually abandoned in a number of jurisdictions for a more liberal test not solely dependent on the bystander's
position. In 1968, bystander liability began to expand to embrace physical
harm stemming from the emotional trauma suffered by one not fearing
for her own safety, but for the safety of another.
The so-called foreseeability test was first delineated in a California
case, Dillon v. Legg." In Dillon, the defendant, as a result of negligent
driving, killed a child. The plaintiffs, mother and sister of the decedent
child, witnessed the child's death. Although the sister might have recovered
under the prevailing zone of danger test because she was put in fear for
her own safety at the time of the child's injury, the mother was not so
positioned. The court, recognizing that to allow the sister to recover and
not the mother would be arbitrary, fashioned a flexible three-pronged
test for bystander recovery. 3 6 The gist of the test was that in certain
circumstances a defendant would not only owe a duty to the physically
injured party but also to closely related persons who might foreseeably
suffer emotional harm as a result of observing such an injury.
Dillon did not dispense with the idea that the positioning of the plaintiff
with respect to the harm was critical in determining whether a duty was
owed to the plaintiff. Nonetheless, the Dillon court recognized that
additional factors might prove reliable in ascertaining whether the emotional harm to the plaintiff was genuine and sufficiently related to defendant's breach of duty to warrant recovery. Although it expanded the
scope of recovery, Dillon nonetheless retained
the requirement that the
37
emotional injury be physically manifested.

33. See Spearman v. McCrary, 58 So. 927 (Ala. Ct. App. 1912); Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co.,
148 N.Y.S. 39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914); Gulf, D. & S.F.R. v. Coopwood, 96 S.W. 102 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1906). See also discussion in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (Tentative Draft No. 4,
1963).
34. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); see also Benson v. National
Surety Co., 183 N.E. 505 (N.Y. 1932).
35. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
36. The test set forth in Dillon is as follows:
l)Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident at the time of
injury as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it.
2)Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from
the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident as contrasted with
learning of the accident from others after its occurrence.
3)Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related as contrasted with an
absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.
Id. at 920.
37. Id. "We note, first, that we deal here with a case in which plaintiff suffered a shock which
resulted in physical injury and we confine our ruling to that case." Id.
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The scope of Dillon was subsequently narrowed in Thing v. LaChusa.3 8
In Thing, a child was injured as a result of the defendant's negligence.
Although the mother did not personally view the accident, she rushed
to the scene of the accident where she found her child badly injured
and unconscious. The mother, believing her child was dead, suffered
emotional trauma for which she sought recovery under Dillon.3 9 The
California Supreme Court denied recovery. 40
Where Dillon had previously been interpreted to extend recovery to
those "near" the accident scene, 41 Thing limited recovery to persons
present at the scene of the accident who were aware of the injury to
the victim as it occurred. In addition, Thing retained the restriction that
only those persons closely related to the victim could recover for emotional
distress.4 2 The court stressed that for emotional distress to be actionable
by a bystander, it must be serious, beyond4 3a disinterested viewer's reaction,
and proportionate to the circumstances.
C. Preexisting Relationship as a Basis for Recovery of Negligently
Inflicted Emotional Distress
The principles utilized to expand the concept of duty in the bystander
cases proved inadequate in cases in which the plaintiff suffered a severe
emotional injury as a result of the defendant's conduct but neither
sustained a bodily injury nor witnessed an injury to a third person. Prior
to 1980, a party who suffered such an injury generally did not have a
recognizable cause of action. In the 1980s, there was a gradual expansion
of recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress where the victim
was able to prove a preexisting relationship with the tortfeasor at the
time of the emotional injury. For convenience, these cases are referred
to as "relational" cases." In such cases, the existence of the relationship
gives rise to a duty to protect the plaintiff from emotional harm .4 The
duty owed to the plaintiff is specific, as opposed to the general duty
owed to the public typical in bystander cases.
In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, the California Supreme
Court advanced recovery for a victim suffering from negligently inflicted

38. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
39. Id. at 815.
40. Id. at 814.
41. See, e.g., Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980).
42. Thing, 771 P.2d at 816.
43. Id. at 828.
44. See, e.g., Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, 770 P.2d 278, 279 (Cal. 1989).
The court found that "[bly undertaking to treat both Robert and Marlene F. [the therapist] had
[tiherefore, it was reasonably foreseeable and easily
a duty of due care to both patients ...
predictable that [the therapist's] battering and sexually molesting Robert F. would lead to serious
emotional distress in Marlene F." Id.
45. See, e.g., id. at 282, noting that the therapist's "abuse of the therapeutic relationship and
molestation of the boys breached his duty of care to the mothers as well as to the children." See
also Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802, 804 (Me. 1985) (holding that patient stated claim against
therapist for breach of duty of care and negligent infliction of emotional distress based on therapist's
involvement with patient's companion).
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emotional distress where the victim could establish a preexisting relationship with the tortfeasor.4 In so doing, the court dispensed with the
necessity of cloaking the cause of action in "bystander" garb. This
reasoning closely parallels the age-old rationale for allowing damages for
mishandling of bodies and errant death notices, i.e.,
a contractual un47
derpinning giving rise to a duty to prevent harm.
The plaintiff in Molien was the husband of Valerie Molien, who had
sought medical care at Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and was treated by
the defendant, Dr. Kilbridge. 48 After examination and testing, Dr. Kilbridge advised Mrs. Molien that she had an infectious type of syphilis.
The diagnosis was wrong. As a result of the mistaken diagnosis, Mrs.
Molien undertook treatment for the syphilis and was advised by Dr.
Kilbridge to inform her husband of the diagnosis, which she did. 49 Mr.

Molien ultimately tested negative for syphilis and subsequently brought
an action against his wife's doctor and Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
claiming that as a result of the defendants' malpractice in diagnosing
his wife he incurred "extreme emotional distress" as well as the ultimate
break-up of his marriage.50
The defendants, relying on Dillon v. Legg, 5' argued that Mr. Molien
did not state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress because
he did not satisfy the "bystander" criteria. In particular, the defendants
argued that Mr. Molien was not entitled 5to
recover because he was not
2
present when the misdiagnosis was given.
The court rejected the characterization of the cause of action as one
grounded on "bystander" liability. Instead, the court reasoned that DilIon's emphasis on foreseeability was an appropriate basis on which to
determine liability where different circumstances gave rise to emotional
injury. Thus, the court held that a duty to Mr. Molien arose on the
part of the defendant because the "risk of harm (as a result of the
negligent diagnosis) was reasonably foreseeable to defendants." 5 3 The
foreseeability of the harm to plaintiff was, at least in part, premised on
the nature of the diagnosis and on the fact that plaintiff's wife had been
advised to inform her husband of the negligent diagnosis. The court thus
found that
a relationship was established between the doctor and the
4
husband .
Notably, Molien also dispensed with the requirement that in order to
recover for emotional injury, the plaintiff plead and prove a "physical

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
Molien, 616 P.2d at 814.
Id.
Id. at 815.
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
Molien, 616 P.2d at 815.
Id. at 817.
Id.
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manifestation" of that injury." The court, in rejecting the physical harm
requirement, stated:
in light of contemporary knowledge we conclude that emotional injury
may be fully as severe and debilitating as physical harm, and is no
less deserving of redress; the refusal to recognize a cause of action
for negligently inflicted injury in the absence of some physical consequence is therefore an anachronism. 6
Some confusion between the relational cases and the bystander cases
has arisen because the relational cases frequently occur under circumstances similar to the bystander cases, i.e., where there is an injury to
a third person. The difference is that in relational cases, the defendant
has an obligation to prevent direct emotional harm to the plaintiff; liability
is not contingent on viewing an injury to another or fear for one's own
safety.
Many of the early relational cases manipulated the facts so as to place
the plaintiff into a "bystander" status. In Haught v. Maceluch," Maceluch, the defendant physician, delayed performing a caesarean section
on Haught until almost eleven hours after she was admitted to the hospital,
despite indications of fetal distress. Haught claimed that as a result of
the physician's negligence her daughter was born with severe brain damage
requiring life-long medical care. She sought damages for her daughter's
injuries as well as for her own emotional distress stemming from her
daughter's condition. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff
awarding her damages for the child's medical expenses, the child's lost
earnings and for her own mental distress. The district court struck the
emotional distress award and Haught appealed."
The Fifth Circuit reinstated the award for emotional distress, reasoning
that the foreseeability test of Dillon v. Legg 9 supported Haught's recovery.
The court stated "The most recent cases . . . have been unanimous in
accepting the so-called modern rule announced in Dillon-namely, the
rule that bystander recovery should be governed by general negligence
principles." 6 The court found that Haught was foreseeable within the
bystander framework of Dillon because "[n]ot only was appellant located

55. In Molien, the court stated: "In our view the attempted distinction between physical and
psychological injury merely clouds the issue. The essential question is one of proof; whether the
plaintiff has suffered a serious and compensable injury should not turn on this artificial and often
arbitrary classification scheme." Id. at 821. The court went on to state "[wle thus agree with the
view of Rodriguez [which states that] 'In cases other than where proof.of mental distress is of a
medically significant nature, the general standard of proof required to support a claim of mental
distress is some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case."' Id. (citing Rodriguez
v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970)).
56. Id.at 814.
57. Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1982). For a discussion of Haught, see Carolyn
A. Goodzeit, Note: Rethinking Emotional Distress Law: PrenatalMalpractice and Feminist Theory,
63 FORDHAM L. REV. 175, 186 (1994); Terry Morehead Dworkin, Fear of Disease and Delayed
Manifestation Injuries: A Solution or a Pandora's Box?, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 535 (1984).
58. Haught, 681 F.2d at 293.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
60. Haught, 681 F.2d at 297.
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near the scene of the accident, she was in some sense the scene itself." ' 6'
In addition, in order to satisfy the Dillon requirement that the plaintiff
"contemporaneously perceive the event," the court held that "[g]iven
the overwhelming strength of the proximity and relationship factors in
this case, we think that a jury could find foreseeability even without the
contemporaneous perception factor, or at least with weaker evidence of
'' 2
it. 6 Although it correctly decided the case, the court ignored
the fact
that a special duty to prevent emotional harm might have arisen on the
part of the defendant as a result of the doctor-patient status of the
parties.
63
Subsequently, in Burgess v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
a case remarkably similar to Haught,64 the California Supreme Court
clarified the scope of liability for emotional distress first enunciated in
Molien. In Burgess, the plaintiff's newborn son suffered severe and
permanent brain damage as a result of the defendant's delay in delivering
the child after diagnosis of a prolapsed cord. The plaintiff mother subsequently sought damages for the emotional distress she suffered as a
result of the injury to her child. 65 Defendants argued that the mother's
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim was barred because she
did not contemporaneously observe the injury to her son as originally
required in Dillon and subsequently modified in Thing.66
The Burgess court rejected the defendants' argument and recognized
that the facts gave rise to the defendants' "direct" liability for plaintiff's
emotional distress as opposed to bystander liability. 67 The distinction
between the two theories of liability "is found in the source of the duty
owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. '6 The court reasoned that
bystander cases are characterized by the fact that the defendant and
plaintiff have no preexisting relationship and that the duty owed to the
plaintiff by the defendant is the same as the duty owed to the public
in general. On the other hand, cases in which the plaintiff is a direct
victim of negligently inflicted emotional distress are characterized by the
fact that the duty owed to the plaintiff is "assumed by the defendant
or imposed on the defendant as a matter of law, or that arises out of
' 69
a relationship between the two."
The presence of the preexisting relationship of the parties is thus
sufficient to establish a duty to prevent emotional harm. In contrast, the
more attenuated the relation'ship, the less likely it will support a duty

61. Id. at 299.
62. Id. at 300. The court used this language to find foreseeability despite the fact that plaintiff
was under the effect of anesthesia at the time of the delivery. Id.
63. 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992).
64. Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1990).
65. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1199.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1200.
68. Id.
69. Id.at 1201 (citing Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, 770 P.2d 278 (Cal.
1990)).
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on the part of the defendant to prevent emotional harm. Indeed, unlike
the mother, the father of the injured child in Burgess was not deemed
to have had a preexisting relationship with the defendant 70 and was not
entitled to recover for his emotional distress resulting from his child's
injury.71
7 2 Impact and Physical Injury as Limitations on
Cancerphobia:
Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress
A duty to prevent emotional distress has gained recognition in the
latter part of this century in cases where the plaintiff has alleged "cancerphobia" and sought compensation for the present fear that she may
develop cancer in the future. 73 The typical cancerphobia case arises when
the plaintiff is exposed to a known carcinogen. Because of long latency
periods, idiosyncratic responses to exposure, and the inability of medical
science to predict the probability of cancer actually developing, the plaintiff may not have suffered a compensable physical injury at the time the
suit is initiated. Nonetheless, the plaintiff may allege emotional distress
at the possibility that an exposure to a carcinogen might result in cancer.
In the cancerphobia cases, the extent of the defendant's duty to the
plaintiff is called into question because the risk posed by the defendant's
conduct is generally one of physical harm as opposed to solely emotional

D.

harm to the plaintiff. 74 If a physical harm can be proved, the loss due

to emotional distress is recoverable as parasitic damages. 75 Where there
is no physical harm, recovery has been allowed in 76some jurisdictions if
the plaintiff can show a legally cognizable impact.
In some cancerphobia cases, courts have strictly adhered to the parasitic
damage rule in determining whether recovery is proper. For example, in
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 77 the plaintiff (Jackson) sued in
federal court for emotional distress stemming from his exposure to as-

70. This result seems somewhat illogical considering the fact that in Molien the court recognized
a relationship between a husband and his wife's doctor. Molien, 616 P.2d at 815.
71. See Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1203. But does it make any sense that the father of a child does
not have a relationship with the doctor, but the husband does? Certainly in both cases the husband's
interest is implicit in the relationship. See also Marlene F., 770 P.2d at 278.
72. For an excellent discussion of the cancerphobia cases see Terry Morehead Dworkin, Fear
of Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A Solution or a Pandora's Box?, 53 FORDrAM L.
REv. 527 (1984). For purposes of this article cancerphobia may be defined as an individual's fear
of developing cancer after being exposed to a known carcinogen. Because some courts consider
phobias to be a compensable physical manifestation of emotional distress, it appears that the term
"cancerphobia" was crafted in an attempt to add validity to a plaintiff's alleged injury. See, e.g.,
Clark v. Perry, 442 S.E.2d 57, 68 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); Capital Holding Corp. v. Bailey, 873
S.W.2d 187, 193 (Ky. 1994).
73. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986); Laxton v. Orkin, 639
S.W.2d (Tenn. 1982); Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp 1553 (I11. 1983).
74. Dworkin, supra note 72, at 546.
75. See, e.g., Deleski v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 819 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1987); Cathcart v.
Keene Industrial Insulation, 471 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Mauro v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corp, 542 A.2d 16 (N.J. Super. 1988); Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th
Cir. 1985).
76. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1985).
77. 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986).
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bestos. He had already been diagnosed with asbestosis, which involved
physical non-cancerous manifestations of asbestos exposure. 78 Jackson
succeeded in convincing the jury that he would probably develop lung
cancer from his asbestosis, and that he would die as a result of the
cancer. 79 Applying Mississippi law, 80 the court held that Jackson was
entitled to recover because it was more likely than not that cancer would
develop. 8 In essence, it was as if Jackson had already contracted cancer.
Although the court relied on asbestosis as the prerequisite physical injury
to the emotional distress claim, 82 it appears that even without that condition the court could have made the emotional distress claim parasitic
to the likelihood that Jackson would develop cancer.
Those courts which strictly adhere to the parasitic damage rule have
refused to allow recovery for cancerphobia where there has been no
objective measurable physical injury. Thus, courts have utilized the parasitic damage rule to determine that the defendant did not have a duty
to prevent plaintiff's fear of cancer.83 In In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos
cases,84 some of the plaintiffs who had worked in shipyards sought
recovery from asbestos manufacturers for physical harm and emotional
distress stemming from their workplace exposure to asbestos.8 5 The shipyard workers, although presenting evidence of exposure to asbestos, had
no symptoms of asbestosis. 86 The court found that there was not a
sufficient basis upon which to award damages for physical injury because
the evidence of exposure did not rise to the level of "functional impairment.

'8 7

With respect to whether the physical changes attributable

to exposure were sufficient to justify an award for emotional distress
the court also responded in the negative. 8 The court held that there must
be "a compensable harm underlying the emotional distress before recovery
may be had for mental anguish." 8 9 The court concluded that any emotional

78. Id. at 410.
79. Id. at 414.
80. Id. at 398. On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals certified open questions of state
law to the Mississippi Supreme Court, 757 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1985) (en banc). The Mississippi
Supreme Court declined certification without discussion, 469 So. 2d 99 (Miss. 1985). Jackson, 781
F.2d at 396.
81. Jackson, 781 F.2d at 414. See also Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994) where this probability rule was also applied.
82. Jackson, 781 F.2d at 414. The court also noted that the plaintiff was entitled to recover
compensatory damages for emotional distress because he had also established gross misconduct on
the part of the defendant. Id.
83. See, e.g., Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1984); Payton v.
Abbott Laboratories, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982); Cathcart v. Keene Industrial Insulation, 471
A.2d 493 (Pa. 1984).
84. 734 F. Supp. 1563 (D. Haw. 1990).
85. Id. at 1567. Defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict for plaintiffs Sakauye,
Chung, Renio, Kuon and Yonashiro, and moved for a new trial for plaintiff Lau. Id. at 1572-73.
86. Id. (plaintiffs Renio, Kuon and Yonashiro).
87. Id. at 1567. The court found that plaintiffs Renio, Kuon and Yonashiro had no physical
injury due to asbestos exposure. However, plaintiffs Sakauye, Chung and Lau did prove a physical
injury and were entitled to recovery for emotional distress damages. Id. at 1572-73.
88. Id. at 1567. The court noted that although plaintiffs Sakauye, Chung and Lau were entitled
to damages for emotional distress, they were excessive under the facts of this case. Id. at 1573.
89. Id. at 1569 (citing Rodriguez v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970)).
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distress without evidence of a functional impairment was unreasonable
as a matter of law. 90 In part, the court relied on statistical evidence
showing that the plaintiffs' likelihood of contracting cancer was remote
given their limited exposure to the asbestos. 9'
Similarly, in DeStories v. City of Phoenix, 92 plaintiffs sought recovery
for emotional distress as a result of their exposure to asbestos. The
Arizona court refused to allow the negligence claim, stating that "[a]lthough
the cases for the most part agree that recovery for mental anguish requires
proof of an accompanying physical harm, they vary widely concerning
the character of evidence held to be sufficient to demonstrate such
harm." 93 The court distinguished cases allowing recovery for the impact
of a toxic substance on plaintiff's body, noting that "the view that mere
ingestion of a toxic substance constitutes sufficient physical harm on
which to base a claim for damages for mental anguish goes beyond the
reach of current Arizona case law." 94
In contrast, some courts have been willing to apply a version of the
impact rule and to allow recovery where there is no physical injury but
where the plaintiff can establish actual exposure to a known carcinogen.
In order to support recovery, the impact must directly result in emotional
trauma "of a kind and extent normally expected to occur in a reasonable
person." 95 In Laxton v. Orkin,96 the plaintiffs brought suit seeking damages for mental anguish, personal injury and property damage as a result
of Orkin's negligence in contaminating the plaintiffs' household water
supply with the toxic chemical chlordane. 97 A verdict was rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs and each claimant was awarded damages for
"injury, mental pain and suffering (mental anguish)" as a result of their
drinking the contaminated water. 98 The Supreme Court of Tennessee,
affirming the judgment, analogized the case to those involving contaminated food products, stating that
[riecovery of damages resulting from the ingestion of deleterious food
or beverages also has been permitted in numerous cases in this state,
though physical injury, if any, was slight .... In many of them,
... recovery was permitted with a minimum showing of physical
injury; where this did occur, full recovery has been allowed for the
fright, shock, or other 'mental' aspect of the claim. 99

90. Id.
91. The court cited a study indicating that the incidence of lung cancer among shipyard workers
would be approximately sixty-seven per million men per year. Id. at 1570 n.10 (citing Kolonel,
Cancer Occurrence in Shipyard Workers Exposed to Asbestos in Hawaii, CANCER RESEARCH 45,
3924 (Aug. 1985)).
92. 744 P.2d 705 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
93. Id.at 710.
94. Id. at 711.
95. Adams v. Clean Air Systems, 586 N.E.2d 940, 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
96. 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982).
97. Id.at 431.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 433-34.
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Upholding the trial court's characterization of this case as a "technical
physical injury," the court reasoned that recovery for negligent infliction
of emotional distress should be allowed where "as a result of a defendant's
negligence, a plaintiff has ingested an indefinite amount of a harmful
substance."' l Whether the ingestion was sufficient to support recovery
without a diagnosable physical injury was, according to the court, a
question of fact for the jury. 01 It appears that the so-called "technical
injury" consisted of exposure to a known carcinogen in a manner capable
of resulting in the plaintiff's contracting cancer.
Some courts have been willing to define impact in a technical sense
in analyzing whether damages for emotional distress were recoverable.
In Wetherill v. University of Chicago,0 2 plaintiffs alleged that they had
been exposed in utero to a form of synthetic estrogen, diethylstilbestrol
(DES), administered to their mothers as part of an experiment conducted
in the early 1950s at the University of Chicago Hospital. Though neither
plaintiff suffered from cancer or a precancerous condition, both brought
suit in Illinois Federal District Court claiming damages for their present
fear of developing cancer in the future. 03 In allowing the plaintiffs' claim,
the court reasoned that so long as there was a physical impact and a
reasonable fear stemming from the impact, a claim for emotional distress
would be proper.'l 4
The court found that the impact requirement was satisfied by the
prenatal exposure to DES occasioned by the defendant's alleged tortious
conduct. 0 5 The reasonableness of the plaintiffs' fears, although not contingent on a high degree of likelihood of future injury,' ° 6 was satisfied
because empirical studies have found a causal relationship between DES
and cancer, and because both scientific and lay information available to
the plaintiffs would lead a reasonable person to be in fear of contracting
cancer after exposure to DES.
II.

FEAR OF AIDS

A.

The Reality of AIDS
AIDS was first recognized in the United States in 1981 after a number
of cases of opportunistic'0 7 infections were reported among homosexual

100. Id. at 434.
101. Id.
102. 565 F. Supp. 1553 (I11.
1983).
103. Id. at 1559.
104. Id. at 1560.
105. "[T]heir fears stem from their prenatal exposure to DES-the 'physical impact' of defendants'
allegedly tortious conduct." Id.
106. Id. at 1559.
107. Opportunistic infections may be defined as "an organism capable of causing disease only
in a host whose resistance is lowered, e.g. by other diseases or drugs." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 990 (5th ed. 1982).

The most common opportunistic infections associated with AIDS are pneumocystis carinii pneumonia, disseminated cytomegalovirus, disseminated mycobacterium avium-intracellular, candida eso-
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men. 0 Shortly thereafter, AIDS was identified in a number of other
groups including intravenous drug users,'0 9 hemophiliacs,1 0 children born
to women who were intravenous drug users,"' and members of certain
populations primarily in Haiti and parts of Africa." 2 Although these
initially identified risk groups still have the highest incidence of reported
cases, the disease has now been confirmed in other groups, including
significant numbers of heterosexuals."' In addition, the epidemic has
turned its force toward Asia and developing countries, leading experts
to predict that by the year 2000, 40 million people will be infected with
AIDS, ninety percent of whom will be in developing countries." 4 Between
1981-90, more than 100,000 people in the United States died from AIDS." 5
In 1991, it was estimated that one million people in the United States
were infected with the virus causing AIDS," 6 which is equal to one in
7
every 250 people."
In 1983, it was confirmed that AIDS was caused by a retrovirus now
known by the acronym "HIV."" 8 Although the process of HIV transmission and infection has been studied in depth, much is still unknown.
What is known leads scientists to believe that the present number of
AIDS victims is merely the tip of the iceberg." 9
The retrovirus works by first infecting a human cell where the genetic
material of the virus, ribonucleic acid (RNA), is transcribed into the
genetic material of humans, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). 20 The virus

phagitis, mucocutaneous herpes simplex, cryptococcus neoformans meningitis, cerebral toxoplasma
gondii, enteric cryptosporidiosis. Another common manifestation of AIDS is Karposi's sarcoma.
See WILLIAM H. DORNETTE, AIDS AND THE LAW 9 (1987).
108. See Pneumocystis Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 250
(Center for Disease Control, 1981).
109. See Mortality Attributable to HIV Infection/AIDS-United States, 1981-90, 40 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 41, 43 (Center for Disease Control, 1991) [hereinafter Mortality].
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See AIDS in Women-United States, 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 845 (Center
for Disease Control, 1990) (reporting AIDS among female sex partners of AIDS sufferers as well
as reports of AIDS in prison populations).
114. See Geofrey Cowley & Mary Hager, The Ever-Expanding Plague, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22,
1994, at 37.
115. See Mortality, supra note 109, at 43.
116. Id.
117. See HIV Prevalence Estimates and AIDS Case Projections for the United States: Report
Based Upon a Workshop, 39 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. RR-16 (Center for Disease
Control, 1990).
118. HIV stands for Human Immunodeficiency Virus. Credit for identification of the virus is
given to Luc Montagnier and Robert Gallo. See Gallo, Isolation of Human T-Cell Leukemia Virus
in Acquired Immune Deficiency (AIDS), 220 SCIENCE 865 (1983); Barrie-Sinoussi et al., Isolation
of a T-Lymphotropic Retrovirus from a Patient at Risk for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS), 220 SCIENCE 868 (1983).
119. See Harold Jaffe, The Application of Medical Facts to the Courts, in AIDS AND THE COURTS
7, 11 (Clark C. Abt & Kathleen M. Hardy eds., 1990). Jaffe makes the point that the famous
"iceberg slide" shown at AIDS lectures indicates that those presently suffering from AIDS are the
so-called tip of the iceberg. Beneath the waterline are those infected with the virus with non-life
threatening conditions (AIDS Related Complex) and the base of the iceberg contains those infected
with the virus who are at present totally asymptomatic. Id.
120. See id. at 8.
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contains a unique enzyme or protein known as 21"reverse transcriptase"
which allows it to transcribe its RNA to DNA.'
This process results in a latent infection which eventually results in
the body's production of antibodies to the virus. The period between
the initial infection and the production of antibodies that are identifiable
in the individual's blood is known as a "window" period. 22 During the
window period, although the virus may be undetectable in an individual's
blood, the individual is nonetheless infected and capable of transmitting
the virus. An individual infected with HIV may not experience symptoms
for months, years or even decades. 23 However, once infected, an individual
becomes and remains infectious to others even if no symptoms are evident.
Moreover, current research indicates that at certain times an individual
may be more infectious than at other times. 124
The HIV virus can be transmitted by an infected person's blood, semen,
or vaginal secretions coming into contact with the blood or mucous
membranes of an uninfected person. 125 Although the virus has been found
in saliva, there have been no reported cases of the virus being transmitted
by a bite or through exposure to an infected individual's saliva. 126 The
outside of the body and cannot be
HIV virus does not survive well
27
transmitted by casual contact.

The spread of the HIV virus has been attributed primarily to highrisk sexual practices. 2 To a lesser degree, transmission has been attributed
to intravenous drug use, blood products used by hemophiliacs, heterosexual sex, and transfusions. 29 Transmission also occurs from a mother
to her child in utero or through her breast milk. 30 About three percent
of HIV infections are unexplained.''
121. See Helena Brett-Smith M.D. & Gerald H. Friedland, M.D., Transmission and Treatment,
in AIDS LAw TODAY 18 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993).
122. See Jaffe, supra note 119, at 8.
123. A study conducted in connection with the San Francisco Department of Health on a group
of homosexual men indicated that at three years postinfection with the HIV virus approximately
five percent of the men in the study had developed symptoms of AIDS. At seven years post infection
approximately one-third of the men in the study had developed symptoms of AIDS. At ten years
only fifteen percent of the men remained symptom free. See id. at 11-12.
124. See Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 121.
125. Id. at 23.
126. See Jaffe, supra note 119, at 19; see also Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Transmission
of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1125, 1129 (1987).
127. Jaffe, supra note 119, at 24.
128. Anal intercourse is considered to be the highest risk practice for spreading the virus due to
the frequent tearing of the mucous membranes. See Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 121, at
25. At highest risk for becoming infected with the HIV virus are sexual partners who are the
receptive partners (i.e., women in heterosexual relationships and receptive men involved in anal
intercourse). Id.
129. Jaffe, supra note 119, at 15.
130. DORNETTE, supra note 107, at 7.
131. See Jaffe, supra note 119, at 16. With respect to the unknown means of transmission, Jaffe
states:
We think, but cannot be certain, that these cases largely represent incomplete
information. Many of these cases have died before they've been reported, or they
may be people who are too ill to be interviewed or who don't want to be interviewed.
When we get the opportunity to talk to these patients . . . we are able to reclassify
the majority of them into one of the groups that I've described.
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A number of issues surrounding the transmission of AIDS and the
disease itself have generated anxiety among the public. The fact that
HIV may not be detectable in an individual's blood during the window
period, but nonetheless remains transmittable, raises serious issues about
the public's exposure to the disease. Similarly, the fact that an individual
may be infected with the disease but remains asymptomatic has raised
anxiety among the public about possible exposure to the disease. Because
the disease was initially viewed as a homosexual disease that was sexually
transmitted, it engendered a reluctance to address the disease and its
modes of transmission. 31 2 Additional reasons why the public fears exposure
to AIDS include the following: there is no immunization effective against
the disease; once infected there is no cure for the disease; the disease
is generally manifested in any number of opportunistic diseases from
fungus to dementia; and the disease itself is invariably fatal. 33 In short,
AIDS is a shocking disease.
What'is clear is that a large portion of the public is either ignorant
of how AIDS is transmitted or chooses not to believe it. A 1988 study
done by the Georgia Institute of Technology' 3 4 indicated that 66% of
the people surveyed would be concerned about sharing a bathroom with
an infected individual, 40% had concerns about sharing a cafeteria, and
63% were concerned about sharing tools. Other surveys indicate that
members of the public still believe AIDS can be transmitted from a toilet
seat or by other means of casual contact.' 35
There is only one known instance of AIDS being transmitted from a
health care worker (HCW) to a patient. 3 6 In that case, it was found
that five patients of an HIV-infected Florida dentist were infected with
a strain of the virus indicative of direct transmission from the blood of
the dentist to the patient. 3 7 The events leading to transmission of the
infection to the patients are unknown.' 38 However, according to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the risk of a HCW trans-

132. See Mervyn F. Silverman, AIDS Medical Education for Lawyers, Judges, and Legislators,
in AIDS AND THE COURTS 27, 31 (Clark C. Abt & Kathleen M. Harvey eds., 1990); see also RANDY
SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON (1987).
133. Silverman, supra note 132, at 31-32.
134. Jaffe, supra note 119, at 34.
135. David Harold et al., Employees' Reaction to AIDS in the Work Place (Ga. Inst. Tech.,
1988).
136. See A Surgeon with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: A Threat to Patient Safety?
The Case of William H. Behringer, 94 AM. J. MED. 93 (1993); Update: Investigations of Patients
Who Have Been Treated by HIV-Infected Health Care Workers, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. 344, 346 (Center for Disease Control, 1992); Update: Investigations of Persons Treated by
HIV-Infected Health-Care Workers-United States, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 329,
331 (Center for Disease Control, 1993) ("Among the 58 investigated practices described in this
report, the dental practice in Florida remains the only documented instance of HIV transmission
from an HCW to patients.").
137. See C. Fordham von Reyn et al., Absence of HIV Transmissionfrom an Infected Orthopedic
Surgeon: A 13-Year Look-back Study, 269 JAMA 1807 (1993).
138. See Update: Investigations of Persons Treated by HIV-Infected Health Care Workers-United
States, 42 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 329, 331 (Center for Disease Control, 1993).
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mitting the virus to a patient is between 0.0000247o and 0.0000024%.19
In light of the statistical probabilities of the transmission of AIDS from
a HCW, there has been speculation that the exposure was intentional in
the Florida cases.' 40 Interestingly, the public's perception of the risk of
transmission from a HCW to a patient does not correlate with the
statistical reality. In a Newsweek poll, forty-nine percent of those polled
4
believed that HIV-positive HCWs should not be allowed to practice.' 1
Considering the widespread fear and misconceptions surrounding AIDS
transmission, numerous lawsuits have been brought seeking damages for
emotional distress due to possible exposure to AIDS. In those cases, as
in any negligence action, it is elementary that in order to establish a
viable claim the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to give rise to a
legally cognizable duty owed to her by the defendant which, in fact, was
breached and which proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.142 That
simple formulation incorporates two obstacles for one seeking recovery
for negligent infliction of emotional distress based on a fear of AIDS.
First, the plaintiff must establish the existence of a relationship between
herself and the defendant giving rise to a legal duty which was in fact
breached. 43 And second, the plaintiff must establish that her injury is
such that it warrants recovery.
The Relational Rationale for a Finding of a Duty to Prevent Fear
of AIDS
A number of the fear of AIDS cases have reached results consistent
with the Molien rationale of allowing recovery where there is a preexisting
relationship giving rise to a duty to prevent emotional harm.'" It does
not strain one's credulity to recognize that the doctor-patient relationship
imposes an obligation on the part of the doctor to use care both in the
treatment and diagnosis of a patient. Neither is it an illogical extension
of existing law to say that the duties arising out of a fiduciary relationship
include the duty to prevent emotional harm in the course of performing
the obligations imposed by the relationship. Thus, where there is a
preexisting relationship, risk of physical harm need not be present in
order for the plaintiff to recover for her emotional distress. 45

B.

139. See D.M. Bell et al., Risk of Hepatitis B and Human Immunodeficiency Virus Transmission
to a Patientfrom an Infected Surgeon Due to Percutaneous Injury during an Invasive Procedure:
Estimates Based on a Model, I INFECT. AGENTS Dis. 263 (1992).
140. See Rob Hiaasen, Proof Lacking But Murder's Popular Theory in AIDS Dentist Puzzle,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 11, 1993, at BI.
141. See Barbara Kantrowitz et al., Doctors and AIDS, NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1991, at 49, 56.
142. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, at 164-65.
143. Id.at 357.
144. See e.g., Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445, aff'd, 31 F.3d 1197 (2d Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 727 (1995). For a discussion of the Molien relational analysis reversed,
see Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
145. Molien, 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980). The risk created by defendant's negligence in diagnosis
was one solely of emotional harm.
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In Faya v. Almaraz,'4 the defendant doctor had operated on both
plaintiffs during a period in which the defendant knew he was HIVpositive. Both plaintiffs learned of the doctor's illness more than one
year after each individual's last operation. 47 Both were tested for HIV,
with negative results. Subsequently, the plaintiffs brought suit seeking
damages for their exposure to HIV, physical injury and costs resulting
48
from medical surveillance in connection with their alleged exposure.1
The Maryland trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint on the
basis that the plaintiffs had failed to plead sufficient facts regarding
exposure to the AIDS virus. 49 The appellate court reversed, holding that
the plaintiffs had stated a claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress for their alleged fear of AIDS. 50 Such a result would have been
explicable under the rationale of the California court in Molien, but the
Maryland court relied in large part on the fact that there was a "theoretical
possibility"'' the defendant could have transmitted the AIDS virus during
surgery. Thus, the court grounded its decision in terms of impact.
The court, in allowing the claim, first considered whether the facts
could support a duty on the part of the doctor to either inform his
52
patients of his condition or refrain from performing invasive surgery.
Although the court did not emphasize the nature of the doctor-patient
relationship, it held that such a duty might arise in light of the possibility
of the risk of transmission coupled with the potential consequences of
transmission.'5 3 The court acknowledged that the physician's duty of care
encompassed disclosure of 4 his HIV status despite the minimal risk of
transmission of the virus.'1
The result in Faya appears to be correct. However, the court, in
reaching the right result, contorted the reasoning used in the impact
cases. The reliance on impact required the court to grope for some indicia
of the risk of physical harm. The problem, however, was that there was
no proof of plaintiff's actual exposure to the virus coupled with a mode
of transmission. The court allowed the mere presence of HIV to constitute
an impact."' The more direct analysis of Molien would have enabled the
court to reach the same result without searching for an elusive possibility
of physical harm. The doctor/patient relationship supports the conclusion

146. 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
147. Defendant died of AIDS on November 16, 1990. The plaintiffs both learned of the defendant's
death from a local newspaper on December 6, 1990. Id. at 329.
148. Id.at 330.
149. In particular, the court noted that there were no reported cases regarding transmission of
HIV from a surgeon to a patient, and the fact that there was no indication that improper barrier
techniques were utilized during the surgeries. Id.
150. Id. at 339. Plaintiffs appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland issued a writ of certiorari prior to intermediate review and reversed and
remanded.
151. Id. at 334.
152. Id. at 333.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See id.at 334.
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that a duty arose to protect the plaintiff from emotional harm in the
form of fear of the risk of transmission of AIDS. The court's focus on
an actual risk of transmission was misplaced. Under a relational analysis,
as in Molien, if a relationship exists such that a duty is recognized to
prevent emotional harm, the court need not find an actual risk of physical

harm.
Thus under the Molien rationale, a court may find a duty despite lack
of actual proof of exposure to HIV if there was a recognized relationship
where the defendant was obligated to protect the plaintiff from emotional
as well as physical harm. Therefore, although the physical risk of AIDS
may be so remote as to bar recovery under any other analysis of duty,
recovery for fear of AIDS is warranted where there is a preexisting

relationship. 156
In Kerins v. Hartley,' the California Court of Appeals rejected its
own previous relational analysis and refused to recognize a duty on the
.part of a physician to prevent fear of AIDS. In Kerins, the plaintiff
(Kerins) brought suit for emotional distress based on the discovery that
her surgeon was suffering from AIDS when he performed surgery on
her. 1 8 Kerins contended she had consented to the surgery expressly upon
59
the condition that the defendant, Dr. Gordon, was in good health.
Approximately eighteen months after her surgery, Kerins learned of the
doctor's condition when she saw a televised newscast wherein he announced his illness.160 Within two weeks of learning of the doctor's
6
condition, Kerins was advised that she tested negative for AIDS.' '
The detailed operative report did not indicate any cuts sustained by
the doctor or any other unusual occurrences which would have substan-

156. See also Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 31 F.2d
115 S. Ct. 727 (1995). Plaintiff railroad employee
1197 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, .U.S.-,
was stuck by a needle in the course of his employment. He claimed that he suffered from "fear
of AIDS". The court allowed his claim by interpreting the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA)
as providing for recovery of emotional distress. That result is also consistent with recognition of
a duty arising out of the employer/employee relationship to avoid infliction of emotional distress.
See also Marriott v. Sedco Forex Int'l. Resources, 827 F. Supp 59 (D. Mass. 1993). Although there
was proof of the likelihood of plaintiff's actual exposure to the HIV virus, the court found the
basis for allowing American seamen to recover for their "fear of AIDS" under the "Jones Act
which incorporates FELA by reference." Id. at 72. Cf. Doe v. Surgicare of Joliet, 643 N.E.2d
Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing that the plaintiff could recover as a direct victim or a
1200 (I11.
bystander but denying recovery based on lack of exposure).
157. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); see also K.A.C. v. Benson, 63 U.S.L.W. 2500
(Minn. 1995), where the Supreme Court of Minnesota rejected the Plaintiff's claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress resulting from her alleged exposure to the HIV virus during a
gynecological procedure performed by the defendant doctor. The court refused to allow the claim
absent proof of actual exposure.
158. Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). The surgery consisted of an
exploratory laparotomy, lysis of peritoneal adhesions, multiple myomectomies, uterine reconstruction
and repair of the broad ligament. Id. at 623.
159. Id. at 626.
160. Id. at 623. The subject matter of the newscast was an AIDS discrimination lawsuit which
the defendant, Gordon, had brought against his partners as a result of their refusal to allow him
to continue practicing after his diagnosis of AIDS.
161. Id.
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tiated an actual risk of transmission to Kerins. 162 In fact, the evidence
indicated that at the time of trial there had been no known instances
of a medical doctor transmitting HIV to a patient. 61 In essence, the
evidence established the mere presence of AIDS in the operating room
and nothing more. The trial court, apparently utilizing a bystander analysis, granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the doctor. In so doing, the court relied in part
on the traditional rule that an individual was entitled to recover for
emotional distress where an intentional tort had been committed.' 64 Kerins'
complaint, according to the court, stated a claim for a technical battery.
If the surgery was in fact conditioned on the doctor's good health and
he proceeded despite his knowledge of having AIDS, then, according to
the court, the patient would be entitled to recover for the intentional
65
tort of battery.
The court also reinstated Kerins' claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, relying on the relational analysis articulated in Molien.
Despite the absence of any evidence of actual exposure to HIV, the court
held that Kerins would be able to recover for her emotional distress
during the period she reasonably believed that she may have contracted
AIDS. 66 The applicable period commenced at the time that she learned
her surgeon was infected with AIDS and ended when she discovered that
she had not actually been exposed to infected blood. 67 The court acknowledged that despite the absence of proof of a verifiable physical
risk, Kerins was entitled to recover because the risk created by the doctor's
conduct, in light of his relationship with the patient, was one of emotional

harm. 161
The Supreme Court of California granted the defendant's petition for
review' 69 and then transferred the case back to the court of appeals "with
directions to vacate its decision and then reconsider the action in light
of Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co."' 70 On rehearing, the court
162. Id.at 628.
163. Id. at 624.
164. See id.Other "fear of AIDS" cases have also recognized that recovery for emotional distress
is warranted where the plaintiff has stated a claim for an intentional tort. See, e.g., Whelan v.
Whelan, 588 A.2d 251 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991) (recognizing that plaintiff, ex-wife of the defendant
had stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and if proven could recover for
her fear of AIDS where the defendant had falsely told her that he was H1V-positive in order to
obtain dissolution of support and alimony orders); Funeral Services by Gregory v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1991).
165. Kerins, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 627.
166. Id. at 632.
167. Id. She tested negatively for HIV antibodies and received counseling with respect to the
accuracy of the testing procedures and the remoteness of the potential transmission more than 18
months after her surgery. Id.
168. See id.at 629.
169. Kerins v. Hartley, 868 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1994).
170. Id. (citing Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993)). In Potter, a
cancerphobia case, the court held that in the absence of physical injury, recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress due to alleged exposure can only be premised on a claim that is
corroborated by reasonable medical and scientific opinion that it is more likely than not that cancer
will develop in the future due to the exposure.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

reversed itself and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment
as to both the negligence and intentional tort claims.17 ' In connection
with the plaintiff's negligence claim, the court imposed a two-part test
for recovery of damages where the claim is based on fear of AIDS. The
stringent test adopted by the court, while not purporting to reject the
existence of a duty owed to the plaintiff, 7 2 nonetheless precluded recovery
in essentially all cases where impact and exposure were absent. The test,
as articulated by the court, required that where a plaintiff has not sustained
a physical injury, she must show exposure to HIV or AIDS as a result
of a breach of duty owed by a defendant.' 73 In addition, the plaintiff
must prove by reliable evidence that "it is more likely than not that he
or she will become HIV seropositive and develop AIDS due to the
exposure.' ' 74 The court, avoiding a discussion of its previous duty
analysis, 175 left unclear the scope of any duty owed to a plaintiff. While
recognizing that recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress is
warranted where the "defendant assumes a duty to the plaintiff in which
' 76
the emotional condition of the plaintiff is the object,' 1 the court nonetheless disregarded any duty a defendant might owe to a plaintiff with
respect to fear of AIDS and concluded that the doctor only owed a duty
to the patient to use due care in the performance of the surgical procedure. 77 The court, in rejecting its earlier duty analysis for "policy"
reasons, studiously avoided discussion of Molien. 7s The result of the
court's decision was to ignore its previously well-reasoned recognition of
a duty based on the doctor-patient relationship to protect a patient from
emotional harm when it is in the form of fear of AIDS.

171. Kerins v. Hartley, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 172, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). With respect to the
"technical battery" claim, the court held that the plaintiff was required to show a significant risk
of contracting AIDS in order to recover. Id. at 180.
172. It appears that the court was focusing on the issue of proximate cause. The court stated
that, "[it is therefore questionable whether appellant's emotional suffering was proximately caused
by the breach of any legal duty owed to her by [defendant]." Id. at 177-78.
173. Id.at 178.
174. Id. at 179.
175. The court stated that,
[ffor purposes of analyzing respondents' liability for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, it is therefore questionable whether appellant's emotional suffering was
proximately caused by the breach of any legal duty owed to her by Dr. Gordon.
Assuming for the very limited purpose of argument that an independent duty of
disclosure was created by appellant's specific inquires about the state of Dr. Gordon's
health, appellant's claim for negligently inflicted emotional distress damages nevertheless falls under Potter.
Id. at 177-78.
176. Id. at 177 (citing Potter, 863 P.2d at 807).
177. Id. The court stated that "Dr. Gordon had an analogous duty to any patient who might
foreseeably come in contact with his blood during surgery to use due care, and comply with current
CDC guidelines governing performance of exposure-prone obstetric/gynecological procedure. It is
not claimed that Dr. Gordon did not use due care in the performance of the surgical procedure
itself." Id.
178. Among the policies referred to by the court were the extent of the class of possible plaintiffs,
inconsistent results and overcompensation of plaintiffs having emotional damages with the result of
a depletion of resources available to pay the claims of plaintiffs who have incurred physical injury.
Id. at 178.
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In many AIDS cases where the relationship has not been of the type
traditionally found sufficient to warrant recovery for emotional distress,
the relational rationale has properly been utilized to reject a finding of
a duty owed by a defendant to prevent the plaintiff's fear of AIDS.179
In Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 80 the plaintiff physician sought damages
for his emotional distress as a result of performing two procedures on
an inmate who the physician subsequently learned had tested HIV-positive.
The New York court recognized that although there may have been a
duty running from the physician to the patient, no such duty ran from
the patient to the physician.' 8 ' In addition, the court held that although
physical injury was not critical to recovery, without proof of an unusual
occurrence or some indicia of reliability with respect to plaintiff's claim
of emotional distress, plaintiff had failed to state a claim on which relief
could be based.1 2 Again, a relational rationale would explain such a
result. Although one could foresee some possible emotional harm under
the circumstances, the relationship of patient/doctor was not one which
would impose a duty on the patient to protect the doctor from "possible"
exposure.8 3 Similarly, courts have denied recovery for emotional distress
4
for negligently inflicted fear of AIDS in marital relationships.'
C. Ignoring the Relationship in Order to Deny Recovery for Fear of
A IDS
Not all courts have embraced a relational analysis where there is an
emotional injury consisting of "fear of AIDS." Thus, in Lubowitz v.
Albert Einstein Medical Center' 5 the Pennsylvania court denied the plain-

179. See Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 597 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987); Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 881
(Idaho 1993); Reyes v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 58 (D.P.R. 1991).
180. 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
181. Id. at 1018. For a discussion of reverse informed consent, see A. Samuel Oddi, Reverse
Informed Consent: The Unreasonably Dangerous Patient, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1417 (1993).
182. Id.
183. See also Reyes, 770 F. Supp. at 63. In Reyes the plaintiff sought recovery for emotional
distress as a result of not being informed that her husband might contract AIDS after a blood
transfusion. The husband did contract AIDS as a result of the transfusion; however, the wife tested
negative for the HIV virus. The court refused to allow the claim stating, "the Puerto Rico Courts
would not be prepared to recognize a duty of a doctor to violate the doctor-patient relationship,
even to disclose the presence of AIDS to a spouse." Id. In this context, the plaintiff stood in the
position of the husband in Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, 770 P.2d 278 (Cal.
1989), in that the underlying relationship was not sufficient to give rise to a duty to prevent
emotional distress. But see Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Il1. 1988).
184. See Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 595. In Doe, the wife sought recovery for her "fear of AIDS"
after discovering that her husband had been involved in homosexual activities during the marriage.
In denying the claim the court stated: "If this cause of action were permitted to continue, any
party to a matrimonial action who alleged adultery would now have a separate tort action for
damages for 'AIDSphobia' because unfortunately any deviation from the marital nest could result
in exposure to AIDS." Id. at 598.
185. 623 A.2d 3 (Pa. 1993); see also R.J. v. Humana of Florida, Inc., 625 So. 2d 116 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993). The plaintiff was erroneously told that he was HIV-positive. More than a
year later it was discovered that he tested negative for the virus. Plaintiff's claim against his doctors
and the laboratory performing the test was dismissed on the basis that there was no actual impact.
However, the court certified the question "does the Impact Rule apply to a Claim for Damages
from a negligent HIV diagnosis?" to the Florida Supreme Court. Id.
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tiff's claim for fear of AIDS on the grounds that recovery was not
warranted where there was no evidence of physical harm. Although the
result is correct under an impact analysis, the court essentially ignored
the existence of the parties' preexisting relationship.
The plaintiff in Lubowitz underwent an in-vitro procedure wherein an
egg, taken from plaintiff (Lubowitz), was placed in a "placental serum"
8 6 The egg
donated by an anonymous donor in order to be fertilized.
was subsequently implanted in Lubowitz. After the implantation, she was
87
informed that the placental donor's blood tested positive for HIV.1
After additional testing on the donor's blood and Lubowitz's blood,
Lubowitz was informed that both tested negative for HIV.
On the basis that there was no proof of actual exposure to HIV and
no bodily injury, the court denied Lubowitz's claim for her negligently
inflicted emotional distress. 8 8 The court failed to consider that, during
the period between the time the patient was informed that she might
have been exposed to AIDS and the period when her fears were put to
rest, she would be entitled to recover on the basis of a doctor/patient
relationship. Indeed, under a relational rationale, recovery would have
been warranted for negligence on the part of a physician resulting in
her patient's emotional distress.
D. Impact: AIDSphobia and Cancerphobia Merge
Where the parties have no preexisting relationship, the courts have
disagreed on the standard required to establish a duty to protect a plaintiff
from emotional harm. Some courts have rejected a finding of a duty
owed to a plaintiff based on the plaintiff's failure to establish a legally
cognizable impact consisting of exposure to the HIV virus together with
a mode of transmission. 8 9 This, of course, is consistent with the rule
sometimes applied in cancerphobia cases with respect to a duty to prevent
emotional harm. Conversely, other courts have rejected the traditional
role of proximity of physical harm and instead focused on the so-called
'reasonableness" of the fear of the plaintiff in finding a duty to prevent
fear of AIDS. ' 9 In so doing, the courts have shifted their focus away
from a duty analysis (i.e., contemplation of the risk of defendant's conduct
and the relationship of the parties) and instead have contemplated legally
cognizable causation and damages.
In Burk v. Sage Products, Inc.,' 91 the Pennsylvania court utilized a
strict impact analysis and denied recovery for plaintiff's fear of AIDS

186. Lubowitz, 623 A.2d at 4.
187. Id. (Lubowitz was also informed three months after the implant that the doctor tested HIVpositive).
188. Id. at 5.
189. See Burk v. Sage Products, 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Carroll v. Sisters of Saint
Francis Health Services, 868 S.W.2d 586 (Tenn. 1993); Neal v. Neal, 873 P.2d 881 (Idaho Ct. App.
1993). See also Poole, 698 F. Supp. 1367 (1988); Smith v. Paslode Corp., 7 F.3d 116 (8th Cir.
1993).
190. See Castro, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
191. 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D.Pa. 1990).
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which he alleged was the result of a needle stick incident. In Burk, the
plaintiff (Burk) was stuck by a needle that was protruding from a container
manufactured by the defendant. Although there was no proof the needle
had been used on an AIDS patient, Burk alleged that at the time of
the incident a number of AIDS patients had been seen on the floor
where he was using the container. 92 Subsequently, Burk tested negative
for the HIV virus on five separate occasions. 193
The court disallowed Burk's negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim reasoning that "plaintiff's only injuries stem from his fear that
he has been exposed to the disease . .. [W]hile injuries stemming from
a fear of contracting illness after exposure to a disease-causing agent
may present compensable damages, injuries stemming from fear of the
initial exposure do not."' In denying recovery, the court properly considered the rationale of the cancerphobia cases and the requirement of
establishing a connection between the breach of duty on the part of the
defendant and plaintiff's injuries. 195 In accord with the cancerphobia
cases, absent proof of an impact of a type that substantiates the proximity
of physical harm (i.e., a known carcinogen or HIV virus) or without
proof of physical injury, recovery of emotional distress damages is barred.
The Burk court also rejected recovery for AIDSphobia based on a "physical injury" or parasitic damages rationale on the basis that it was
substantially certain that plaintiff would not ultimately contract AIDS.' 9
Similarly, the Tennessee court in Carroll v. The Sisters of Saint Francis
Health Services'97 denied the plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress based on a fear of AIDS, relying in large part on the
cancerphobia cases. 98 In Carroll, the plaintiff (Carroll) was visiting her
sister in the hospital and washed her hands in a wash basin. Searching
for a paper towel, Carroll put her hand in a nearby container used to
dispose of contaminated needles and was pricked on three of her fingers.1'9
She was immediately tested for HIV antibodies and retested on five
occasions over the next three years, and all test results were negative. 2°°
Nonetheless, Carroll brought suit for her emotional distress resulting from
her fear of possibly contracting AIDS.
The plaintiff argued that as long as her fear was "reasonable," she
should be entitled to recover. The court rejected this argument. Instead,
the court imposed an objective requirement of actual exposure as a

192.
193.
194.
195.
1985).
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 286.
Id.
Id. at 288.
The court relied in part on Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271 (3d Cir.
Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 288.
868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1993).
The court discussed Laxton v. Orkin, 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982); Gamble v. Mintz, 1991

Tenn. App. LEXIS 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 1991); and Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Co., 855
F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
199. Carroll, 868 S.W.2d 586.

200. Id. at 586-87.
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threshold for recovery. 20' According to the court, proof of "exposure"
must be established at a minimum for recovery for fear of AIDS 20 and
2
any recovery would be limited to a defined "window of anxiety.
In essence, the Carroll court used the impact rationale, finding that
there must be proof of a sufficient risk of actual physical harm (i.e.,
exposure) in order to find that
the defendant had a duty to protect the
20 3
plaintiff from AIDSphobia.
E.

Extending a Duty to Prevent "Fear of AIDS" Where There is
Neither a Relationship Nor Cognizable Physical Risk
In contrast, the New York court in Castro v. New York Life Insurance
Co.,204 abandoned the restrictions of proximity of harm and/or relationship and allowed recovery for the plaintiff's fear of AIDS despite
the absence of proof of actual exposure or physical injury. The plaintiff
in Castro was a cleaning worker who was pricked by a needle found in
a waste container in the defendant company's offices. The plaintiff alleged
that on the date of the incident the insurance company's employees had
been taking blood samples from prospective life insurance applicants and
disposing of the syringes in a manner prohibited by state law. 20 5 As a
result of the needle prick, the plaintiff's psychiatrist averred that she had
developed "a massive and overwhelming fear that she had contracted
AIDS and would die soon. ' ' 206 The plaintiff was subsequently tested on
a number of occasions for the HIV virus and apparently refused to
disclose the results of the testing. 207
The Castro court held that the plaintiff had stated a claim for recovery
for her fear of AIDS. 208 The court's analysis leaves much to the imagination. The court began with the recognition that, in order to support
aofclaim, the plaintiff must prove that2 9her AIDSphobia is a direct result
the defendant's breach of duty. 0 The court then retreated
to a
''reasonableness" analysis, finding that "any reasonable person exposed
to this information [information provided by the media regarding the
transmission of AIDS] who is stuck by a used and discarded hypodermic
needle and syringe from which blood was apparently drawn could develop
a fear of contracting AIDS." ' 2'0

201. Id. at 593.
202. See id. at 594.
203. Id. See also Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). Plaintiff was bitten
while trying to restrain an inmate. A nurse stated that the patient "might" have AIDS. The court
refused to allow the plaintiff's claim for his "fear of AIDS" on the basis that there was no proof
the inmate was infected with AIDS and no actual physical injury attributable to a risk of AIDS.
Id. at 126.
204. 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
205. Id. at 696.
206. Id. at 697.
207. Id. at 696.
208. Id. at 697.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 698.
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What the court failed to recognize is that the existence of fear, in and
of itself, has consistently been rejected as a basis for the finding of a
duty. 2 1 If the reasonableness of a plaintiff's fear is the measure of duty,
then certainly the earlier cases' reliance on positioning and relationship
have unduly restricted recovery. Indeed, based on public perception, it
is not unreasonable to fear AIDS when one is a co-worker of an AIDSor where one has to share utensils with one who is
infected individual
2
HIV-positive.

21

The reasonableness of a plaintiff's fear is certainly relevant to the issue
of damages. 213 However, it traditionally has not been used in determining
the existence of duty and breach. By focusing on the plaintiff's fear
rather than the actual risk created by the insurance company's alleged
conduct, the court extended the scope of recovery for fear. Although
such an extension of liability might be desirable, it is in marked contrast
to the careful historical limitations placed on recovery in other phobia
cases.
In Vallery v. Southern Baptist Hospital,2 4 the Louisiana Court of

Appeals resorted to a contortion of the impact rationale in order to
allow recovery for "fear of AIDS." The plaintiffs in Vallery were husband
and wife. Mr. Vallery was employed at the defendant hospital as 21a5
security guard and was called on a particular night to subdue a patient.
When Mr. Vallery attempted to restrain the patient, the patient's intravenous needle apparently became dislodged and he bled on Mr. Vallery's
hand. After completing his shift Mr. Vallery went home and had sexual
intercourse with his wife. The next day he was informed that the patient
suffered from AIDS. 216 Both Mr. and Mrs. Vallery tested negative for
HIV. Mr. Vallery's claims against the hospital were barred by the applicable Workers Compensation Statute. 217 Mrs. Vallery's claim for fear
of AIDS, however, was upheld on appeal.
Mrs. Vallery claimed that, as a result of her husband's "exposure,"
she was put in fear that she might contract AIDS because of having sex
with him before he was advised that he had been exposed to the HIV
virus. 21

The court, relying on the cancerphobia impact reasoning, held

that in order for the plaintiff to recover she must establish the presence
of AIDS as well as a channel for transmission of the virus. 21 9 The court

acknowledged that the plaintiff had not pleaded a channel of transmission

211. For example, if fear were the measure of existence of a duty then certainly both
should recover for their fear with respect to an injury to their child. See Burgess, 831
1197.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
213. See Colla v. Mandella, 85 N.W.2d 345 (Wis. 1957); Davis v. Cleveland R.R., 21
169 (Ohio 1939); Haile's Curator v. Texas & P.R. Co., 60 F. 557 (5th Cir. 1894); Delta
Co. v. Ganakas, 91 S.E.2d 383 (Ga. Ct. App. 1956).
214. 630 So. 2d 861 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
215. Id. at 862.
216. Id. at 863.
217. Id. at 869.
218. Id. at 864.
219. Id. at 867.
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in that there was no allegation that Mr. Vallery had any cuts on his
hand when he was exposed to the HIV-positive blood. 220 The court,
nonetheless, left the transmission issue to Mrs. Vallery's proofs, relying
on the fact that there might be a channel of transmission since hospital
22
personnel wear gloves and the plaintiffs were advised to get AIDS testing.
The court, in determining that there was a duty owed to Mrs. Vallery
applied an "ease of association test ' 222 and concluded that "there is an
intuitive association between the failure to warn Mr. Vallery and the
emotional distress which befell Mrs. Vallery.

'22

1

Under any version of the impact reasoning, the conclusion in Vallery
must be wrong. The Vallerys failed in the first instance to plead more
than mere presence of HIV in that no actual physical risk giving rise
to a duty was established without pleading a viable means of transmission
to Mr. Vallery. With respect to Mrs. Vallery, the "impact" became mere
speculation. The presence of the virus at the time of intercourse with
her husband was at best tenuous. More importantly, the existence of a
means of transmission from one who had a minimal contact with AIDS
infected blood was never established.
. CONCLUSION
The evolution of the law regarding recovery for negligently inflicted
emotional distress has been influenced largely by attempts to limit frivolous
suits, avoid fraud and to achieve judicial economies. In light of the
prevalence of AIDS and the public's perception of the risk of AIDS,
the courts' applications of historical limitations in determining whether
a duty to prevent fear of AIDS exists will achieve these goals.
Approaching the AIDSphobia cases from a duty perspective provides
the advantage of determining the viability of the plaintiff's claim at the
outset of the case, thus contributing to judicial efficiency. It also provides
consistency as to recovery.
In many AIDSphobia cases, a relational analysis would allow recovery
in instances where the impact test has previously been applied with
inconsistent results. Recovery would be allowed where the parties are in
a special relationship such as the doctor/patient relationship or other
relationships recognized by law. Recognition of a relational basis for a
duty to prevent AIDSphobia will support recovery-regardless of the
presence of actual exposure to AIDS-where the type of relationship
provides an indicia of responsibility with respect to the emotional distress.

220. Id.
221. Id. at 868.
222. Id. at 869. The court applied the test set forth in Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1045,
1055 (La. 1991). "The critical test in Louisiana, however, is phrased in terms of 'the ease of
association' which melds policy and foreseeability into one inquiry: Is the harm which befell the
plaintiff easily associated with the type of conduct engaged in by the defendant?" Vallery, 630 So.
2d at 868.
223. Vallery, 630 So. 2d at 869.
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Similarly, in those cases where the plaintiff's AIDSphobia is premised
on impact, consistency in recovery will be realized where legal impact is
indicative of the presence of a verifiable physical risk of harm. Thus,
where impact is the sine qua non of recovery, there must be both actual
exposure and a mode of transmission of HIV to establish the defendant's
duty.
Unfortunately, both impact and relationship have been given different
meanings by various courts. If a coherent, cohesive approach to the
concept of a duty to prevent emotional distress were utilized in the
AIDSphobia cases, conformity in results would follow. An intelligible
approach to defining the obligation to prevent emotional distress will
serve the judicial system in the twentieth century and beyond.

